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Introduction 
 
With a daily turnover of around US$5.1 trillion (BIS 2016), the global foreign 
exchange market has generally been perceived to be tremendously liquid, even during 
crises and stress in the financial system. However, the recent rise of algorithmic and 
high-frequency traders1 poses a practical, as well as, theoretical challenge with regards to 
the traditional way to conceptualise market liquidity. On the one hand, high-frequency 
traders are often simply portrayed as extremely fast human traders in the mainstream 
economics and finance literature. Following such a logic, it is easy to see how this 
technological development could serve to increase market efficiency, the level of 
competition and the provision of liquidity – and ultimately result in lower transaction 
costs and an enhanced price discovery process (Bershova and Rakhlin 2013; Broogard 
et al. 2014; Conrad et al. 2015; Hendershott et al. 2011). On the other hand, critics 
argue that algorithmic traders, and high-frequency traders in particular, by being able to 
react and anticipate order flow faster, ultimately crowd out the liquidity traditionally 
provided by human traders – having unknown consequences from a macro-perspective. 
For instance, by reacting ultra-fast to new information, including to new orders 
submitted by humans or other machines, markets increasingly populated with 
algorithmic traders have become susceptible to a withdrawal of liquidity at an 
unprecedented speed and scale. As Janet Yellen, Chair of the U.S. Federal Reserve 
pointed out in August 2017 (Federal Reserve 2017): “Algorithmic traders […] are a 
larger presence in various markets than previously, and the willingness of these 
institutions to support liquidity in stressful conditions is uncertain.” This statement is 
echoed by the occurrence of several so-called “flash crashes”, which have involved 
violent price moves and sudden liquidity withdrawal in electronic markets. Notably, 
such events have typically occurred in large and liquid markets traditionally perceived 
to be exceptionally resilient.  
 
The increase of non-human trading could pose a particular risk for the foreign 
exchange market, which, in contrast to the stock market, is free from circuit breakers. 
Large-scale liquidity withdrawal during times of stress could, therefore, act as an 
“amplifying mechanism” (BIS 2017) and, due to the international nature of the foreign 
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exchange market, have a more devastating impact on the global financial system (BIS 
2011; Harris 2013). However, with its origins in anonymous and exchange-traded 
markets, the high-frequency trading debate rarely addresses the unique elements of 
over-the-counter markets such as foreign exchange, where the provision of liquidity is 
based upon trust, relationship and ultimately underpinned by conventions. 
 
 
Foreign exchange market liquidity and conventions  
 
“Human decisions affecting the future […] cannot depend on strict mathematical 
expectations since the basis for making such calculations does not exist,” Keynes (1936, 
162–3) wrote. However, because of conventions, or “that the existing state of affairs will 
continue indefinitely, except in so far as we have specific reasons to expect a change” 
(Keynes 1926, 152), uncertainty about the future does not necessarily need to result in 
chaos. By allowing expectations about the future to become more harmonised and 
orderly, conventions act as important stabilisers for the provision of liquidity.  
 
In contrast to stock markets, the global foreign exchange market is almost exclusively 
traded over-the-counter and thus dependent on trust and the relationships between the 
counterparties involved.2 Traditionally, the market making function has been 
undertaken by human traders at banks, who quote prices to customers on demand. 
However, in order to be able to so, they also have to commit to quoting prices to each 
other. This convention, to stand ready to supply the market with liquidity, is voluntary 
and has rested upon a long-standing mutual understanding among banks. Although the 
convention of liquidity provision in the foreign exchange market is voluntary by nature, 
it has received a more formalised status by being incorporated in the Model Code. The 
Model Code, published by the ACI, which, since 1955, has served as the trade 
organisation for bank, as well as central bank, dealers in the foreign exchange and 
money markets around the world emphasises the importance of social norms and 
conventions by stating that “[…] bilateral reciprocal dealing relationships are common 
[…] and often extend to unwritten understandings between Dealers to quote firm two-
way dealing prices” (ACI 2015). Further, the trade organisation sees informal reciprocal 
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dealing relationships as “a logical development” and that they “play an important role 
in providing support and liquidity.”  
 
The term “liquidity” in this sense refers to the concept of market liquidity, which is 
generally understood to take three dimensions: price (how much it costs to turn around 
a position over a short period of time), volume (how much can be bought or sold 
without moving the price) and speed (how long it takes for the price to recover after an 
“exogenous shock”) (Kyle 1985). Price-based liquidity is typically measured as the 
difference between the bid and offer price at any moment in time (the bid-offer spread). 
Here, surveys conducted by Cheung and Wong (2000) and Cheung and Chinn (2001) 
among foreign exchange dealers suggest that the “market convention”, rather than 
indicators directly linked to costs (as suggested by mainstream economic and finance 
theory), appeared to be the overwhelming driver of the prevailing bid-offer spread in 
the late 1990s.3 Stenfors (2017), using data up to 2016, finds that such conventions 
may still be dominant in the foreign exchange swap markets. Likewise, volume-based 
conventions in terms of “standard amounts” in foreign exchange markets have been 
important in determining how much market liquidity is acceptable to request, or 
reasonably to provide, at the prevailing bid-offer spread. As Stenfors (2014) argues, 
market makers may feel a long-term “sense of duty” towards the bank and the 
institutional setting of the market. In this respect, voluntary liquidity provision could 
simply be seen as the right thing to do – akin to a “decorum” passed on from previous 
generations of market makers and therefore a product of past processes (Veblen 1899, 
190–1).  Speed-based conventions provide guidance as to how long a price for a certain 
amount of liquidity is deemed to be valid: “[…] a dealer has to assume that a price given 
to a voice/traditional broker is good only for a short length of time, typically a matter 
of seconds” (ACI 2009).  
 
Electronic trading does not, per se, pose a threat to such conventions. Humans can, and 
increasingly do, communicate and interact electronically. High-frequency traders, by 
contrast, are non-human and anonymous by definition and are thus neither required 
nor suitable for conventions made by and for humans.  
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The illusion of liquidity  
 
Whereas humans might be able to trade in a matter of seconds, high-frequency traders 
comfortably deal in milliseconds, microseconds or nanoseconds. This inevitably poses a 
treat to the social structure of the group hitherto largely composed of human traders at 
banks, and the “consensus of views held by the body of these individuals as to what is 
right, good, expedient […]” (Veblen 1899, 194).  
 
Humans cannot compete with machines in terms of speed. Neither can they form 
trusting and reciprocal relationships with machines. It is therefore not surprising that 
high-frequency traders have come to be classified as “dark” and “predatory” (perhaps 
perversely, given the notorious opaqueness of the foreign exchange market). Moreover, 
human foreign exchange traders have increasingly complained that “the market 
disappears as soon as you try to deal,” thereby suggesting that conventional market 
making rules have been challenged, or even broken, through the entry of machines. 
This is consistent with broader concerns raised that better market liquidity as a result of 
non-human trading could have a tendency to be accompanied by an “illusion of 
liquidity” or a “liquidity mirage” (King and Rime 2011; ESRB 2016).  
 
However, investigating the validity of claims of an illusion of liquidity requires a study 
of events the human trader’s eye is unable to see or at least instinctively react to. Rather 
than a matter of seconds, it would involve the activity that takes place within a shorter 
time span than it takes for a human to blink (which psychologists approximate to be 
0.1–0.4 seconds). To do so, we conduct an empirical investigation using a rare high-
frequency dataset from Electronic Broking System (EBS) from 21:00:00 GMT on 8 
September 2010 to 20:59:59 GMT on 13 September 2010 (excluding the weekend). 
EBS the most widely used trading platform among banks and high-frequency traders 
saw an increase of algorithmic trading from just 2% in 2004 to around 50% in 2010 
(Moore et al. 2016). We concentrate on the world’s most actively traded currency pair, 
€/US$, which, due to the extremely large turnover, has been at the forefront of high-
frequency trading in the foreign exchange spot market.4  
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On EBS, traders can either submit a market order (demand liquidity) or a limit order 
(provide liquidity). A trader can also cancel a limit order (withdraw liquidity).5 
 
< Table 1 here > 
 
The dataset contains more than 1.4 million €/US$ limit order submissions during just 
three 24–hour trading days (see Table 1). This corresponds to an average of 328.6 new 
orders of at least €1 million per minute. The widely used proxy for price-based market 
liquidity (the bid-offer spread) is extremely tight. Furthermore, the market also appears 
liquid in terms of the standard measure of market depth (how much can be bought and 
sold at the prevailing best bid-offer spread). Using this volume-based proxy for liquidity, 
the average market depth of the €/US$ FX spot market for our dataset is €16.2 million. 
Thus, at the outset, the market appears very large and liquid – consistent with being the 
most widely traded currency pair in the world.  
 
However, the size of a financial market can play an important role in creating and 
sustaining an illusion of liquidity (Stenfors and Lindo, 2016). After a closer empirical 
investigation of the dataset (see Table 2), a string of observations are notable which, 
when put together, illustrate that some perceptions can be deceptive.  
 
< Table 2 here > 
 
First, despite the tight bid-offer spread, the volume traded at either the bid or offer 
price, is relatively low. The actual turnover amounts to approximately €12 billion, 
which is minuscule when put in relation to the total liquidity provided (over €1.8 
trillion). Likewise, the number of executed trades (9,151) is extremely low in comparison 
to the number of limit orders submitted (1,419,630).  
 
Second, although the €/US$ dataset contains some very large limit orders (the largest is 
€250 million), the vast majority (86.5%) of the limit orders are precisely for €1 million 
– which is the minimum allowed size on EBS. Markets populated with high-frequency 
traders tend to observe a high number of (small) limit orders in relation to market 
	 7	
orders. The indicators are consistent with a strong presence of such traders, and that 
the conventional standard amount (historically in the region of 5–10 million) has been 
eroded, at least in the €/US$ foreign exchange spot market. 
 
Third, whereas the total number of limit order submissions, when seen in isolation, 
portrays a liquid market at all times, the lifetime of the limit orders paints a more 
nuanced picture. Using the timestamp of the limit order submissions and the 
corresponding cancellations, we can measure the lifetime of each limit order. The 
average lifetime of orders is 44.9 seconds. However, the average is boosted by relatively 
few orders than remain in the limit order book for minutes or even hours. The median 
lifetime of the limit orders is just 2.5 seconds – more or less in line with the convention 
of measuring speed-based liquidity in “a matter of seconds”. 
 
In order uncover whether a liquidity illusion might be prevalent, we need to study what 
the human trader’s eye is unable to see or at least instinctively react to. Put differently, 
we want to investigate whether, and how fast, human or non-human traders react to 
new information entering the EBS universe by withdrawing liquidity. To do so, we 
begin by using the time-stamp of the 1.4 million limit order submissions as reference 
points. We then calculate the change in the limit order volume on each side of the order 
book (buy and sell), following each new order submission – but excluding the limit 
order submission itself. Given that high-frequency traders have the ability to react faster 
than humans, we select six different time windows (0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1, 5 and 10 seconds) 
to investigate potential differences when allowing for human traders to have time to 
react – thus providing a deeper insight into the dynamics of the liquidity withdrawal 
process as a whole. For instance, if the EBS limit order book consists of €15 million 
buy orders and €10 million sell orders immediately prior to a new limit order 
submission, the limit buy order volume is €15 million and the limit sell order volume is 
€10 million. If, 1 second after a limit order has been submitted, the limit order book 
contains €12 million buy orders and €8 million sell orders, the change in the limit buy 
order volume is –€3 million and the change in the limit sell order volume is –€2 
million. Table 3 shows the results.  
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< Table 3 here > 
 
As can be seen, a new limit order submission immediately triggers more liquidity 
provision. However, within 0.2 seconds, the net impact is already negative. The process 
can be illustrated with an example. Using the hypothetical €15 million above as a 
starting point, the limit buy order volume has increased by €0.106 million to €15.106 
million within 0.1 seconds. Within 0.5 seconds, however, it has decreased by €0.932 
million to €14.068 million. However, between 1 and 5 seconds, the change in the order 
book gradually begins to normalise towards zero. The results for the change in the limit 
sell order book are almost identical.  
 
Thus, a new limit order submission immediately triggers more submissions than 
cancellations in terms of volume – consistent with the notion that high-frequency 
traders provide market liquidity. The extra liquidity added up to 0.2 seconds is, however, 
not accessible to humans. As mentioned previously, it is estimated that it takes 0.1–0.4 
seconds for a human to blink. By the time humans, plausibly, have had time to react to 
the new limit order submission, or when, even, human traders have been able to see 
the market impact, the submission has caused liquidity withdrawal.  
 
 
Conclusions 
 
By being attached to the daily trading routine and/or integrated within the 
institutional structure, the confidence in the relevance and validity of conventions can 
be long-lasting (Carvalho 1983–1984; Lawson 1985). Indeed, despite wide-reaching 
changes in financial markets and the international financial system as a whole, the 
conventions with regards to liquidity provision in foreign exchange markets have 
remained remarkably intact for close to half a century. Ultimately, they have been 
upheld through mutual understanding among financial institutions – in other words, 
reciprocity and trust among humans. 
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Importantly, formal or informal conventions extending to liquidity provision do not 
extend to machines. As we have shown, high-frequency traders do not simply react 
faster than humans to new information (such as new orders submitted by others), they 
do so by withdrawing liquidity before humans instinctively have had the ability to 
access liquidity. Thus, over time, as slower liquidity providers become relatively less 
confident in the ability to provide and demand immediate liquidity, the traditional 
human market making function could be crowded out. This already seems to have 
taken place among the major currency pairs in the foreign exchange spot market, where 
electronic platforms such as EBS have become the ultimate liquidity source of choice 
(Moore et al. 2016) – even during periods of volatility and stress. Whereas this could be 
seen as a long overdue development in a global financial market dominated by 
relatively few banks, the gradual breakdown of this institutionalised convention could 
also pose systemic risks. As we have demonstrated, liquidity might also be withdrawn 
when it is needed the most. Or more likely: liquidity will be withdrawn when it is needed 
the most. 
 
 
Footnotes 
 
1 Whereas algorithmic trading encompasses a range of mathematical modelling and computer 
programming in order to enhance the execution process, high-frequency traders use the advantage of 
speed to trade on new information (faster than humans), to take advantage of price discrepancies (faster 
than humans) and to provide and withdraw liquidity (faster than humans). 
2 According to the BIS (2016), the exchange-traded foreign exchange market amounts to a daily turnover 
of US$0.115 trillion in comparison to the US$5.067 trillion-a-day OTC foreign exchange market. 
3 The reasons for following such conventions were usually relationship-based or institutional (such as “to 
maintain an equitable and reciprocal trading relationship”. 
4 The US dollar and the euro are the two largest currencies in the world, and the €/US$ foreign 
exchange spot market has an average daily turnover of US$494 billion (BIS 2013). 
5 In addition to price, volume and buy/sell indicators, we also use the millisecond timestamp provided. A 
unique trader identification code is attached to each order, allowing us to match order submissions and 
order cancellations (however, the identities or institutions are not revealed). 
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Table 1: Overview of €/US$ FX spot limit orders on EBS 8–13 September 2010 
Limit order submissions      1,419,630    
Total limit order amount       €1,818,803,000,000  
Bid-offer spread  Mean (median)  0.0083% (0.0079%)    
Market depth   Mean (median)  €16.167 million (€13.000 million)   
Sources: EBS and authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 2: Transactions, market orders, amounts and lifetimes 
Transactions (executed amount)   €11,927,000,000   
Transactions (number of executed trades)  9,151    
Limit orders / market orders   99.43%    
Minimum limit order size    €1,000,000   
Maximum limit order size    €250,000,000  
Proportion of small limit orders (€1 Mio)  86.50%    
Limit order lifetime  Mean (median)  44.9 seconds (2.5 seconds)   
Sources: EBS and authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 3: Change in limit order volume   
Time window (seconds)   0.1 0.2 0.5 1 5 10 
Change in limit buy order volume (€mio) 0.106 -0.114 -0.932 -0.999 -0.849 -0.835 
Change in limit sell order volume (€mio) 0.103 -0.135 -0.968 -1.048 -0.769 -0.426 
Sources: EBS and authors’ calculations. 
